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CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF JUDICIAL
REMEDIES: PRESIDENT NIXON'S PROPOSED
MORATORIUM ON "BUSING" ORDERS
FRANK THOMPSON, JR.,* AND DANIEL H. POLLITTt
The school bus is a familiar sight on the American education scene.
The big yellow bus criss-crosses the rural byways, or speeds along mod-
ern highways to the "consolidated" school, and picks up approximately
forty percent of the children who go to school each day. For years, no
one seemed to mind-except those who attended private parochial
schools and therefore were denied this free transportation.
In the South, there were two buses: one carrying black children to
black schools, and one carrying white children to white schools. No one
seemed to mind-except the blacks who were denied an equal education.
Then, as the dual educational systems began to end, the black
children rode the same bus with white children to the formerly "white"
school, and "busing" became an issue. When it appeared that white
children would be transported from the white suburbs to the formerly
"black" inner-city schools, "busing" became a dirty word.
But not everywhere, and not for long. Consider, for example, the
case of Hoke County, North Carolina. Hoke County is a small rural
community of 18,000, with 4,850 children of school age: 50 percent
black, 35 percent white, and 15 percent Lumbee Indian. For years, the
county operated three different school and transportation systems. The
white children were a year ahead of their black and Indian counterparts
at the midway mark and two full years ahead by time of high school
graduation. Then came integration, a unitary system under which each
school, and each class, now reflects the county-wide population. But
with integration came advance planning. Attention was focused on what
happens at the end of the bus ride. There were conferences with fearful
parents and apprehensive students. The capacities and achievements of
each child were measured, and special needs and problems were identi-
fied and anticipated. The result was a marked success. White students
continued to progress as before, and black and Indian students began
to catch up. And the daily bus ride was cut down by an average of fifteen
minutes.'
*Member of the United States House of Representatives.
tProfessor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
'Mondale, Busing in Perspective, THE NEw REPUBLIC, March 4, 1972, at 18.
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Senator Mondale, after two years as Chairman of a Senate Select
Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, reports that Hoke
County is not an isolated or unique phenomenon. His conclusion, after
two years of study of the problems nationwide, is that "integrated edu-
cation-sensitively conducted and with community support-can be
better education for all children, white as well as black, rich as well as
poor. It has been tried and is working."
'2
But the facts are either not known or not accepted. Many parents
fear that their children will be "bused" into alien neighborhoods, and
they are eager for any relief. And some political candidates were eager
to promise relief. "Busing" became the big issue in the Florida "Presi-
dential primary," in which there was a separate "busing" referendum
item on the ballot. On March 14, 1972, the people of Florida went to
the polls, selected Alabama's Governor Wallace as their preference for
the Presidency, and voted almost three-to-one against "compulsory bus-
ing.
It was almost inevitable that the "busing" issue would reach na-
tional dimensions, and it did within a few days.
THE NIXON MORATORIUM PROPOSALS
On March 16, 1972, President Nixon announced on nation-wide
television that he was sending to Congress two bills on "busing." 4 One
was a bill "[t]o impose a moratorium on new and additional student
transportation" and provides in essence that all existing court decrees
"shall be stayed" to the extent that they require any school board to
1d. at 17.
'The actual count was 78% against busing. There Goes the Bus, THE NEw REPUBLIC, April
1, 1972, at 13. Also, 79% of the Floridians voted for desegregated, "equal opportunity" public
education. Id.
'The bills were introduced on March 20 by William M. McCulloch, the senior Republican
member of the House Judiciary Committee. Mr. McCulloch subsequently repudiated them both
when a thorough study convinced him that they were unconstitutional and unjust. When (then
Acting) Attorney General Richard Kleindienst came to testify before the House Judiciary Commit-
tee in favor of the bills, McCulloch declared:
It is with the deepest regret that I sit here today to listen to a spokesman for a
Republican Administration asking the Congress to prostitute the courts by obligating
them to suspend the equal protection clause (of the Constitution) so that Congress may
debate the merits of further slowing down and perhaps even rolling back desegregation
in public schools.
He asked the witness: "What message are we sending to our black people? Is this any way to govern
a country? Is this any way to bring peace to a troubled land?" AFL-CIO News, April 15, 1972, at
6, col. 4.
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transport a student who was not being transported immediately prior
to the entry of the court order. 5
The other Nixon bill was styled as one "[t]o further the achieve-
ment of equal educational opportunities."6 On the positive side, it de-
clares that all children enrolled in public schools "are entitled to equal
educational opportunity without regard to race, color, or national ori-
gin," 7 and then it authorizes the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) and the Commissioner of Education to concentrate
federal funds on "basic instructional services and basic supportive serv-
ices for educationally deprived students."' 8 It declares that "the neigh-
borhood is an appropriate basis for determining public school assign-
ments,"' and then it imposes certain limitations on the powers of the
federal courts to remedy racially discriminatory school assignments and
plans that are in violation of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. For those in the sixth grade and below, the proposed
bill provides that "no court" shall implement a plan to end segregation
that will increase "the average daily number of students" transported,
the "average daily distance to be traveled," or the "average daily time
of travel" over the comparable average for the preceding school year.'0
Concerning those in the seventh grade and above, the proposed law
provides that "no court" shall remedy a segregated plan of education
with busing provisions that increase the average number of students
transported, the average daily distance traveled, or the average daily
time of travel, unless other techniques have been tried and found want-
ing." These other techniques include free transfer of students from a
school in which students of their race comprise a majority to a school
in which their race is a minority; the revision of attendance zones or
grade structures, if this can be done without increasing the transporta-
tion of students; the construction of new schools and the closing of
inferior schools; and the establishment of magnet schools or educational
parks. 2
5H.R. 13916, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a) (1972). The moratorium was to begin the day after
the enactment of the bill and was to terminate either on July 1, 1972, or on the date of enactment
of the companion bill, whichever was earlier.




[Old. § 403(a). (It has been the personal experience of one of the authors, who is the father
of three children, that integration is easier and more effective at the first grade level than when it
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There is one other notable limitation on the courts: they are not to
ignore or alter a school district line "except where it is established that
the lines were drawn for the purpose, and had the effect, of segregating
children among public schools on the basis of race, color, or national
origin."'
,3
So much for the "bare bones" of the proposed laws. Flesh was
added at a White House Conference on March 17 when the highest
administration officials "briefed" the press on the President's proposed
laws." Several items are of interest. The first is that the Administration
sent the bills to Congress for enactment without studying the legal
implications. The proposal law would curtail the power of the federal
courts to implement their judgments, and a reporter asked, "Is there a
precedent in case law for this kind of action?"' 5 Attorney General (then
Acting Attorney General) Richard G. Kleindienst replied in the nega-
tive. He said, "There is no precedent in exactly this kind of situation
. . . ." The only analogy he could offer was that of the National Labor
Relations Act, by which Congress had limited the remedies available to
the National Labor Relations Board "to apply between employees and
employers in representation [sic].''6
The second item of interest is that the Administration sent the bills
to Congress without any study of the factual need for the proposed laws.
Administrative officials were asked, "How much busing is going on now
for the purpose of desegregation . . .?"' Wilmot Hastings, General
Counsel of HEW, replied: "[W]e don't have any breakdown. . . .We
have no data on miles, distance, or times, the breakdown, or what the
relative amount of desegregation busing and nondesegregation busing
amounts to.' 18
IVd. § 404.
"Representing the Administration were John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for
Domestic Affairs; George P. Schultz, Director of the Office of Management and Budget; Elliot
L. Richardson, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; and Richard G.
Kleindienst, (then Acting) Attorney General; and several members of their respective staffs. White




'id. One can then only question the "findings" in § 2(a) of the proposed Moratorium bill:
"For the purpose of desegregation, many local educational agencies have been required to reorgan-
ize their school systems, to reassign students, and to engage in the extensive transportation of
students. . . .[Tlhese reorganizations, with attendant increases in student transportation, have
caused substantial hardship to the children thereby affected . H.R. 13916, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. §§ 2(a)(l)-(2) (1972).
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The third item of interest is the political nature of the proposal. A
reporter asked: "If, as the experts have testified here, we do not even
know the extent of busing involved in the desegregation process, then
what is the hard evidence that supports a Presidential call for a morato-
rium on busing."' 9 John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for
Domestic Affairs, answered this one:
"I think you have come from some other planet not to be able to
answer that question. Every place that you go around this country...
this is the front burner issue in most local communities ...
Now, that is the evidence. It carries by such a preponderance that
it cannot just be swept under the rug by some sort of statistical eva-
sion.""
The fourth item is that the President's proposals turn the clock
back to 1896, the year in which the Supreme Court announced the
"separate but equal" doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson.21 A reporter asked:
"Why is this not a return to separate but equal; if the moratorium on
busing stops future busing plans and the financing of inner city schools
encourages and develops those schools. '2 2 Another reporter asked how
the courts could end segregated education "without some form of trans-
portation, since the facts of life are that blacks and whites don't live
together. 2 3 The reply of Dr. Schultz, then Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, can be reduced to this one sentence: "There
is no necessary reason why one must desegregate everything. ' 2 But the
equal education under the proposed laws will be not only separate but
also unequal. Secretary Elliot Richardson of HEW told the reporters
that the Administration was not asking for any funds for schools other
than the amounts theretofore sought under earlier laws; 25 Dr. Shultz
implied that there is no new money involved 2 and added that there were
no present plans to ask for future additional funds with which to up-
grade the quality of the inner-city schools. 2
The purpose of this article is not to comment further on any aspects
"Press Release at 24.
20d.
21163 U.S. 537 (1896).




2 1d. at 12.
21ld. at 20.
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of the proposed bills, other than the constitutional issue of congressional
control over the courts. But first, some retracing of recent history is
necessary to know how we arrived at where we now stand.
THE 1954 BROWN DECISION AND CONSEQUENT STATE EFFORTS TO
CURB THE FEDERAL COURTS
Until 1954, the District of Columbia and some seventeen states
required a dual segregated system of public education, and four addi-
tional states permitted segregation on a local-option basis."8 The legal
justification for a segregated school system rested on an analogy to the
1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,9 in which the Supreme Court had
sustained the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute requiring separate
but equal accomodations for white and black railroad passengers.
In 1954, the issue of segregated public schools was brought to the
Supreme Court in five different cases that arose in Kansas, South Caro-
lina, Virginia, Delaware, and the District of Columbia. In Brown v.
Board of Education,30 a unanimous Court refused to "turn the clock
back . . . to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written"'" and held that
the forced segregation of Negro school children "from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."3 The Court
concluded that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate
but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal. ' '3
The first shoe was dropped. 34 But "because of the great variety of
local conditions '" '35 involved in the five cases before it, the Supreme
'Pollitt, Equal Protection in Public Education: 1954-61, 47 AAUP BULL. 197, 198 (1961).
-l63 U.S. 537 (1896).




31The general initial reaction was one of resigned acceptance. The Governor of West Virginia
immediately announced that his state would abide by the Brown decision. Governor Cherry said:
"Arkansas will obey the law-It always has." Governor Whetherby announced that "Kentucky
will do whatever is necessary to comply with the law." Oklahoma's Governor Raymond Gary
warned that the school boards then contemplating defiance would get no aid or comfort from him;
and similar statements were issued by the Governors of Virginia, North Carolina, and other
southern states. See Pollitt, supra note 23, at 200-01 & n.30.
1347 U.S. at 495.
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Court put off the task of issuing an order until it could hear the views
of all the parties (and interested intervenors) as to the appropriate next
step. In 1955 the order came down." The Court recognized that the
termination of a segregated school system "may require solution of
varied local school problems" and that the local school boards had the
best knowledge and therefore the primary responsibility to resolve these
problems. 37 Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the cases to the
courts in which they had originated, with instruction that the local
courts require the local school boards to "make a prompt and reasona-
ble start" toward ending segregation and that the local courts maintain
jurisdiction to ensure the admission of Negro students to the public
schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis "with all deliberate
speed.
138
By then, resistence in sone quarters had mounted to a fever pitch.
Mob violence erupted when Autherine Lucy sought to enroll at the
University of Alabama,39 when James Meredith attempted to enroll at
the University of Mississippi,'" and when nine black students enrolled
at the "white" high school in Little Rock, Arkansas. Governor Faubus
put the Little Rock school "off limits" to "colored" students, ugly
crowds drove the black children away,4' and President Eisenhower dis-
patched federal troops to enforce the federal court "desegregation"
order.12 The resulting" 'chaos, bedlam and turmoil'" was cited as justi-
fying a postponement of the school integration,4 3 but the Supreme
Court said "no." The Court ruled as follows:
"Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
371d. at 299. Contrast the proposal of President Nixon that the Congress "specify appropriate
remedies for the elimination of the vestiges of dual school systems" throughout the land, wherever
they exist. H.R. 13915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(b) (1972).
11349 U.S. at 300-01.
"Pollitt, supra note 23, at 201.
"'James Meredith was not the first black to attempt enrollment at the Universityof Missis-
sippi. Clennon King was the first. He was arrested while standing in line at the administration
building and taken to a nearby state mental hospital for examination. Clyde Kennard was the
second. He was arrested and later convicted of reckless driving as he approached the administration
building. The first Negro to apply for admission to the University of Georgia was suddenly
inducted into the Army, despite previous exemption due to physical disability; and another, after
nine years of litigation and a Supreme Court decision in his favor, discovered that he was unable
to qualify for admission to the University of Florida Law School under recently enacted admission
standards. Pollitt, supra note 23, at 201.
"Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1958).
12See Pollitt, Presidential Use of Troops to Execute the Laws: A Brief History, 36 N.C.L.
REV. 117 (1958).
11358 U.S. at 12-13.
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The constitutional rights of [Negro school children] are not to be
sacrificed or yielded to the violence and disorder which have followed
upon the actions of the Governor ....
• . .[Tihe constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated
against in school admission on grounds of race or color . . . can
neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state
executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through
evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted "ingeniously or
ingenuously."44
And there were indeed many schemes, ingenious and ingenuous, to
thwart the Supreme Court school integration decisions. First came the
"interposition" or shocked-indignation statutes. In the legislative ses-
sions of 1956 and 1957, some nine Southern states enacted interposition
resolutions. Although they varied in detail, all condemned the Brown
decision as an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative authority by the
Courts, and all called for the state to "interpose" itself between the state
citizens and the federal courts." In 1960, the Supreme Court agreed
with the federal district court in New Orleans that "interposition is not
a constitutional doctrine. If taken seriously, it is an illegal defiance of
constitutional authority."4
Then came a number of efforts, like the current Nixon proposals,
designed to "curb" the federal courts in the area of school desegrega-
tion. First were the "get the judges" proposals. Since it was the federal
courts that had ended segregated education (neither the Congress nor
the President had taken any steps in this direction), the "logical" move
by segregationists was to cleanse the courts of the "misguided" judges.
"Impeach Earl Warren" signs appeared all over the South, and Georgia
lead the way with a legislative resolution calling upon Congress to initi-
ate impeachment proceedings against all the Justices of the Supreme
Court.1
7
There was a parallel move to limit or eliminate entirely the power
of the federal courts to rule on school segregation matters. Florida
proposed a constitutional amendment that would have made all Su-
44Id. at 16-17.
4'Pollitt, supra note 23, at 201. Compare the preamble of the Nixon Moratorium bill: "There
is a substantial likelihood that ... many local educational agencies will be required [by the courts]
to implement desegregation plans that impose a greater obligation than required by the fourteenth
amendment .... " H.R. 13916, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a)(5) (1972).
"sUnited States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960).
4See Pollitt, supra note 23, at 202.
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preme Court decisions in this area reviewable by the United States
Senate. 8 Senator Eastland of Mississippi introduced legislation to de-
prive the Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction to hear school
desegregation cases. This bill was defeated in the Senate by the narrow
margin of forty-one to forty.49
There were a number of additional efforts to prevent the federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction. Louisiana "withdrew" its consent to
be sued without prior legislative approval of each proposed law suit.
Alabama declared that school boards are "judicial" bodies and, ergo,
are immune from suit. Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, and Vir-
ginia authorized their governors to "seize and operate" the various
school systems, with the hope and expectation that a suit against the
governor would be considered to be a suit against the state and hence
beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts under the eleventh amend-
ment. 0
"Barratry" and "champerty" laws were enacted to disbar the attor-
neys who filed school integration suits,5' and companion laws were
passed to "get" the NAACP, which generally financed the law suits.
These latter laws took many forms. Some required the discharge from
state employment of all those who belonged to or contributed to the
NAACP.5 2 Others merely required the public disclosure of all members
and contributors, with the hope and expectation that public pressure
would do the job. 53 State sovereignty commissions, un-American activi-
ties committees, commissions on education, and similar state agencies
were established to investigate "racial activities."54 The chairman of the
Virginia committee announced that his investigations would be devas-
tating to the NAACP, would "'bust that organization . . . wide
open,' -5 and could be used to keep the NAACP out of litigation, which
is the heart of the organization.
But the federal courts, with the total support of the Supreme Court,
stood firm in the face of this state legislative onslaught. All the above,
491d.
41d.; see Pollitt, Should the Supreme Court be Curbed? A Presentation of Civil Liberties
Decisions in the 1957-58 Term, 37 N.C.L. REv. 17 (1958).
"Pollitt, supra note 23, at 202.
"See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
"See, e.g., Shelton v. McKinley, 174 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
OSee, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
"See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
"Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344, 347 (1959).
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and similar schemes for defeating the orderly processes of school deseg-
regation, were declared unconstitutional. And, with the passage of time,
the Supreme Court began to press for results.
In 1964 the Supreme Court ruled that "[t]he time for more 'deliber-
ate speed' has run out ... *"56 In 1968 it ruled that "[tihe burden on a
school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises realisti-
cally to work, and promises realistically to work now." 7 In October
1969 it ruled that "the obligation of every school district is to terminate
dual school systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only
unitary schools. '5 8 In December 1969 the Supreme Court denied two
requests for more delay, because "[t]he burden on a school board is to
desegregate an unconstitutional dual system at once." 9
6Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964). This case involved Prince Edward
County, Virginia, one of the defendants in the 1954 Brown decision. After that adverse opinion,
the county officials had closed the public schools and had contributed public support to "private"
segregated white academies, leaving the black population substantially without any educational
opportunities. The Court ordered the local school board to reopen the public schools and to cease
giving financial assistance to the parents of the white children attending the "private" schools..
57Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (emphasis by the Court). Here, the
Supreme Court held that a "freedom of choice" plan that allows the individual pupil to choose
his own public school does not constitute adequate compliance with the decision in Brown v. Board
of Educ. There were two schools in the county and no attendance zones. Under the "freedom of
choice" plan, all the white children chose the school formerly restricted to whites, and all but a
handful of the black children selected the school formerly restricted to blacks. The Court ordered
the school board "to convert promptly to a system without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school,
but just schools." 391 U.S. at 442.
-'Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969) (per curiam). In early July,
the court of appeals ordered a number of Mississippi school systems to desegregate by the opening
of the coming school year. In late August, the Department of Justice (on the recommendation of
the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) moved the court of appeals
to delay the date of the integration order, and the court of appeals did so. See Alexander v. Holmes
County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 1218 (Black, Circuit Justice, 1969). The Supreme Court reversed
and directed the school systems "immediately to operate as unitary school systems within which
no person is to be effectively excluded from any school because of race or color." 396 U.S. at 20.
"2Dowell v. Board of Educ., 396 U.S. 269, 270 (1969) (per curiam); accord, Carter v. West
Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 226 (1969) (per curiam). In Carter, the court of appeals on
December I, 1969, ordered certain plans for the desegregation of three Louisiana school districts
but postponed the effective date of the plans until the school year of 1970-71. The Supreme Court
reversed and ordered the plans implemented by February 1, 1970. In Dowell, the district court on
August 13, 1969, ordered the revision of some school attendance boundaries by September 2, 1969.
On August 27 the court of appeals reversed the "partial plan." The Supreme Court in turn reversed
the court of appeals because the school board must "desegregate an unconstitutional dual system
at once." 396 U.S. at 270 (emphasis added).
In Keyes v. School Dist. Number One, 396 U.S. 1215 (1969), the court of appeals had
postponed a desegregation order "on the premise that public support for the plan might be devel-
oped" during the period of delay. Id. at 1217. Mr. Justice Brennan, sitting as a Circuit Justice,
[Vol. 50
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To comply with these decisions it is sometimes necessary to order
that the children living in one segregated neighborhood attend schools
located in a different neighborhood. This requires transportation, or
busing. The constitutionality of this judicial remedy was decided for the
first time in a series of cases decided in the spring of 1971.
THE 1971 BUSING CASES
In his television address of March 16, 1972, President Nixon came
out against "busing children across a city to an inferior school just to
meet some social planner's concept of what is considered to be the
correct racial balance."6' He also inveighed against "social planners
who insist on more busing even at the cost of better education."', Ear-
lier, he had told the nation that "I am opposed to the busing of children
simply for the sake of busing. ' 6 2
The implication in these statements is that the federal courts-from
Chief Justice Burger on down-approved of busing "for the sake of
busing," that the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts had em-
barked upon a massive busing program to achieve "racial balance" in
each and every classroom throughout the nation. Nothing could be more
erroneous.
In April 1971 Chief Justice Burger wrote three decisions, in which
all members of the Supreme Court agreed, dealing with various and
different "busing" problems. But nowhere in any of these opinions did
the Court say anything directly or remotely to justify the implications
in the President's broadside.
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,3 the
district judge had ordered that all schools have approximately the same
racial balance "so that there will be no basis for contending that one
reversed. Citing the Little Rock case, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I (1958), he said that "the
desirability of developing public support for a plan designed to redress de jure segregation cannot
be justification for delay .... " 396 U.S. at 1217.
cOStone, Moving the Constitution to the Back of the Bus, New York Review of Books, April
20, 1972, at 10.
"N.Y. Times, March 17, 1972, at 22, col. 1.
'2 This was on August 3, 1971, when he announced at a press conference that he had asked the
Secretary of HEW to submit to Congress an amendment to the proposed Emergency School
Assistance Act that would "expressly prohibit expenditure of any of those funds for busing." N.Y.
Times, Aug. 4, 1971, at 15, col. 3. The Emergency School Assistance Act authorized the expendi-
ture of $1.5 billion to aid and assist in the process of achieving a "unitary" school system. Id.
13306 F. Supp. 1299, 1312 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
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school is racially different from the others." 4 He also ordered that the
children beyond walking distance be "bused" to their new schools. The
Supreme Court unanimously approved of this "plan" under the particu-
lar situation existing in that city, stating that "[a]wareness of the racial
composition of the whole school system is likely to be a useful starting
point in shaping a remedy to correct past constitutional violations." 5
In the companion case of McDaniel v. Barresi,5 the Board of
Education of Clarke County, Georgia (not the federal court) established
geographic zones for the elementary schools, with the proviso that pup-
ils in Negro residential "pockets" were to be bused to schools in other
attendance zones. The resulting Negro enrollment ranged from twenty
to forty percent in all but two schools, in which it was fifty percent. The
white-black ratio in the system as a whole was approximately two to
one. The Supreme Court also unanimously approved this plan because
of the particular situation existing in that county.
In neither case did the Supreme Court approve fixed "racial quo-
tas." In the Swann case, it approved the "norm" of a 71-29 white-to-
black ratio in all the schools, but only as a "starting point" to end
segregation. The Court expressly noted that had the district court re-
quired "as a matter of substantive constitutional right, any particular
"4Charlotte had segregated residential patterns that had resulted in part from federal, state,
and local govermental action. Prior to Brown Charlotte had a segregated dual school system. After
Brown Charlotte embarked upon a school construction program, locating a series of small elemen-
tary schools deep within the different residential zones. In 1966, Charlotte abandoned its dual
school system and assigned children to the school nearest their homes under a free transfer pro-
gram. The result was that two-thirds of the Negro students attended 21 schools that were either
totally or more than 99% black. The faculties and the school buses were equally segregated.
Judge McMillan ordered school assignment on a "satellite zone" basis. One black inner-city
school was grouped with two or three white outlying schools; children from grades one through
four were assigned to the outlying schools; and children in grades four through six were assigned
to the inner-city schools. The Supreme Court approved of these gerrymandered school districts
and attendance zones:
Absent a constitutional violation there would be no basis for judicially ordering
assignment of students on a racial basis. All things being equal, with no history of
discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes.
But all things are not equal in a system that has been deliberately constructed and
maintained to enforce racial segregation. The remedy for such segregation may be
administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situatons and may
impose burdens on some; but all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided in
the interim period when remedial adjustments are being made to eliminate the dual
school systems.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971).
"Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971).
6402 U.S. 39 (1971).
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degree of racial balance or mixing, that approach would be disapproved
and we would be obliged to reverse. The constitutional command to
desegregate schools does not mean that every school in every com-
munity must always reflect the racial composition of the school system
as a whole.
'67
In both of these cases, the Supreme Court approved of the busing
of some school children because "[d]esegregation plans cannot be lim-
ited to the walk-in school. 68 But the Supreme Court again was careful
to note that there might well be limits imposed on future busing plans.
The Court expressly warned the lower courts that "[a]n objection to
transportation of students may have validity when the time or distance
of travel is so great as to either risk the health of the children or
significantly impinge on the educational process." 9 The Court then
added: "It hardly needs stating that the limits on time of travel will vary
with many factors, but probably with none more than the age of the
students."
70
To underscore and emphasize this point, the Supreme Court noted
the "busing" situation in each of the two cases before it. Under the new
desegregation plan in Clarke County, "[t]he annual transportation ex-
penses of the present plan are reported in the record to be $11,070 less
than the school system spent on transportation during the 1968-1969
school year under dual [segregated] operation."' Under the new deseg-
regation plan in Charlotte-Mecklenburg,
[t]he trips for elementary school pupils average about seven miles and
the District Court found that they would take "not over 35 minutes at
the most." This system compares favorably with the transportation
plan previously operated in Charlotte under which each day 23,600
students on all grade levels were transported an average of 15 miles
one way for an average trip requiring over an hour.7"
It was because of "these circumstances" that the Supreme Court af-
firmed the use of "bus transportation as one tool of school desegrega-
tion."73
More germane to this article, however, are the Court holdings




11402 U.S. at 40 n.2.
7402 U.S. at 30 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
131d.
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regarding the "broad remedial powers of a court" in school desegrega-
tion cases to order "interim corrective measures. 74
The litigation in the Swann case began in the spring in 1969, and
the district court then ordered the school board to consider a plan that
included elements of "busing." The North Carolina General Assembly
promptly enacted an "Anti-Busing Law. ' 75 This statute prohibited the
local schools boards from doing any of three things: It provided that
"[n]o student shall be assigned or compelled to attend any school on
account of race . . " that no student shall be assigned to any school
"for the purpose of creating a balance or ratio of race," and that
"[i]nvoluntary busing of students in contravention of this article is.
prohibited . *."..- In North Carolina State Board of Education v.
Swann,77 the Chief Justice ruled for a unanimous Supreme Court that
the state law was unconstitutional because "it operates to hinder vindi-
cation of federal constitutional guarantees.
78
The Supreme Court concluded that the prohibition against school
assignments on the basis of race "against the background of segrega-
tion ' 7 1 in this case could not withstand constitutional challenge; other-
wise it "would render illusory the promise of Brown v. Board of
Education."8 The Court concluded on this point that "[j]ust as the race
of students must be considered in determining whether a constitutional
violation has occurred, so also must race be considered in formulating
a remedy."' S To compel school authorities to be "color blind" and
ignore factors of race would deprive them "of the one tool absolutely
essential to fulfillment of their constitutional obligation to eliminate
existing dual school systems.""2 The Court similarly concluded that the
"prohibition against transportation of students assigned on the basis of
race" will hamper the ability "to effectively remedy constitutional viola-
tions," for "bus transportation has long been an integral part of all
public educational systems, and it is unlikely that a truly effective rem-




-Ch. 1274, [1969] N.C. Sess. L. 1495.
71N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115-176.1 (Supp. 1971).
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In McDaniel v. Barresi,84 it was similarly argued by those opposing
the school integration that the fourteenth amendment required that the
school authorities be "color blind" in making school assignment. The
Supreme Court answered as follows: "The Clarke County Board of
Education, as part of its affirmative duty to disestablish the dual school
system, properly took into account the race of its elementary school
children in drawing attendance lines. . . .Any other approach would
freeze the status quo that is the very target of all desegregation pro-
cesses."1 .
The short of the matter is that the Supreme Court in the three cases
held that a "busing" order is the "one tool" available to the federal
courts that is "absolutely essential" for the vindication of constitutional
rights. The question thus posed is whether the Congress can, consistent
with the constitutional concept of separation of powers, deprive the
courts of this essential remedial device.
THE ESSENTIALITY OF REMEDIES TO THE JUDICIAL PROCESSES
At the White House Press Conference on March 17, the adminis-
tration officials denied that the proposed "moratorium" on busing or-
ders would undermine the constitutional right of black children not to
be sent to segregated schools. They sought to distinguish between the
"constitutional right" and the remedies for establishing this right.
A reporter asked: "The court has set a standard under Swann
which it deems to be constitutional. Now, are you saying that what
Congress should ordain is something less than what Swann declared?
-4402 U.S. 39 (1971).
"Id. at 41. In Swann, those opposed to the integration order argued that the "busing" was
prohibited by Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c, which provides in part
that "nothing herein shall empower any official or court of the United States to issue any order
seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school by requiring the transportation of pupils ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, and said:
There is no suggestion of an intention to restrict those powers or withdraw from courts
their historic equitable remedial powers. The legislative history of Title IV indicates that
Congress was concerned that the Act might be read as creating a right of action under
the Fourteenth Amendment in the situation of so-called "de facto segregation," where
racial imbalance exists in the schools but with no showing that this was brought about
by discriminatory action by state authorities. In short, there is nothing in the Act which
provides us material assistance in answering the question of remedy for state-imposed
segregation in violation of Brown I. The basis of our decision must be the prohibition
of the Fourteenth Amendment that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws."
402 U.S. at 17-18.
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Would it be constitutional then?" 8 White House Counsel Edward L.
Morgan replied as follows: "We are saying that Congress has the power,
under the substantive legislation, to define the limitations on the
remedy. We are not in any way attacking the constitutional right.""
This attempt to distinguish between "rights" and "remedies" is
subterfuge at best. A right without a remedy is like a bell without a
clapper: an empty promise demeaning to the judge, breeding cynicism
and disrespect for the processes of the law. This attempted dichotomy
has no place in our constitutional heritage. To the contrary, the opposite
has been the law since (and was even before) the landmark decision by
Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.88
On the very eve of his administration, President Adams appointed
a number of "midnight" judges. One of them was William Marbury,
who was appointed to a minor judicial office in the District of Colum-
bia. But in the rush and confusion, the "commission" of Marbury was
not delivered to him prior to the time President Jefferson took office.
It was found in the Department of State, already signed and sealed, and
Secretary of State Madison refused to deliver it. Marbury brought suit
to compel its delivery, and the Supreme Court first held that he had a
lawful right to it. The Court then moved on to "the second inquiry,"
which it stated as follows: "If he has a right, and that right has been
violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy? 81 9 Chief
Justice Marshall answered emphatically in the affirmative: "The very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual
to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One
of the first duties of government is to afford that protection."" The
Chief Justice then added: "The government of the United States has
been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will
certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no
remedy for a violation of a vested legal right."'"
Both before and ever since the 1803 decision in Marbury v. Madi-
son the Supreme Court has ruled that the power to issue a remedial
order is an essential ingredient of the "judicial" power of the United
States.
"Press Release- supra note 14, at 18.
"ld. (emphasis added).
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On several occasions, unforeseen and unforeseeable circumstances
deprived the Supreme Court of power to issue a judgment it deemed
appropriate, and on these occasions the Supreme Court refused "to
proceed to judgment '9 2 because its judgment "would be incomplete and
ineffectual. 9
3
On other occasions, an Act of Congress rendered the judgments of
the courts "incomplete and ineffectual," and on these occasions the
courts were quick to call a halt. The issue arose as early as 1792. In that
year the Congress enacted a "pension" law for the benefit of widows
and orphans of the Revolutionary War veterans. 4 It directed the courts
of the United States to hear the claims and determine the appropriate
pensions. But, the courts were directed to certify their decisions to the
Secretary of War, who was authorized to pay cr to refuse payment in
his discretion.
The Supreme Court refused to have anything to do with the claims,
because the power given to the courts by the Pension Act was "not
judicial power within the meaning of the Constitution, and was, there-
fore, unconstitutional.""5 Mr. Chief lustice Jay noted that "the govern-
ment . . . is divided into three distinct and independent branches and
that it is the duty of each to abstain from, and to oppose, encroachments
on either."9 He concluded that since the Congress authorized the Secre-
"2Hunt v. Palao, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 589, 590 (1846). This case was an appeal to the Supreme
Court from the Territorial Court for the Territory of Florida. While the appeal was pending,
Florida became a state and the territorial court was abolished. Mr. Chief Justice Taney dismissed
the appeal out of hand, because "there is no tribunal to which we are authorized to send a mandate
to proceed further in the case, or to carry into execution the judgment which this court may
pronounce." Id.
9 McNulty v. Batty, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 72, 80 (1850). Here, the case was on appeal to the
Supreme Court from the Territorial Court in the Territory of Wisconsin. Pending appeal, Wiscon-
sin became a state and the territorial court was abolished. The Court dismissed the appeal "because
there is no court in existence to which the mandate of this court could be sent to carry into effect
our judlment. Our power, therefore, would be incomplete and ineffectual, were we to consent to a
review of the case." Id.
"Act of March 23, 1792, ch. 11, I Stat. 243.
5This quote is from a note appended to the opinion in United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 40, 52, 53 (1851), which summarizes the results of United States v. Todd, a 1792 case
unreported at the time, and the opinions expressed by the justices of the Supreme Court in the
note to Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 409, 410 (1792).
"Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 409, 410 (1792) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court
made no decision in Hayburn's Case, but the opinions of the judges of the Circuit Courts of New
York, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina are given in a note. These judges consisted of at least
one Supreme Court Justice per circuit. See United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 49-
50(1851).
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tary of War to review the decisions of the courts, the power given the
courts by the Pension Act was not "judicial." Mr. Justice Iredell added
that
the Legislative, Executive and Judicial departments, are each
formed in a separate and independent manner ....
.. .[N]o decision of any court of the United States can, under
any circumstances . . . agreeable to the Constitution, be liable to a
reversion, or even suspension, by the Legislature itself, in whom no
judicial power of any kind appears to be vested, but the important one
relative to impeachments. 7
Mr. Justice Wilson added that "[i]t is a principle important to freedom
that in government, the judicial should be distinct from, and indepen-
dent of, the legislative department."98 He wrote that the Pension Act
reservation of power in the legislature to revise and control the "judg-
ments" of the judiciary was "radically inconsistent with the independ-
ence of that judicial power which is vested in the courts."9
On the few subsequent occasions when Congress sought to regulate
or control the judgments of the Supreme Court, the legislative interfer-
ence was declared to be unconstitutional.' 0 Thus, in Gordon v. United
States'' Congress had by special statute retained the right to refuse to
pay the judgments issued by the Supreme Court, and as a consequence
the Court refused to hear any cases arising under the statute. Mr. Chief
Justice Taney explained that "[t]he award of execution is a part, and
an essential part of every judgment passed by a court exercising judicial
power" 02 and that the Constitution confers no authority "to the legisla-
tive or executive departments to interfere with [the] judgments or pro-
cesses of execution" of the Supreme Court.
It appears from all the sources, then, that the issuance of remedial
orders is an integral part of the judicial process, and if the courts are to
act at all, their judgments are immunized from Congressional control.
That moves us on to the next question: Does Congress have constitu-
'12 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 412-13 (emphasis added).
"Id. at 411 (emphasis in original).
"Id.
"'See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); United States v. Ferreira, 54
U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1851).
1'117 U.S. 697 (1864).
10Id. at 702.
[Vol. 50
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tional authority to deny the federal courts the power to hear and decide
busing cases?
CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OVER THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE
SUPREME COURT
President Nixon's proposed Equal Educational Opportunities Bill
provides that "no court" shall order the implementation of a desegrega-
tion plan that requires an increase in the number of children "bused"
to school." 4 This language, if enacted into law, would prohibit the Su-
preme Court from issuing the type of order it issued last spring in the
Swann opinion.
At the Press Conference on March 17, (then Acting) Attorney
General Kleindienst was asked if there were any precedent for this kind
of action, and he replied in the negative.'" 5 However, he might have cited
the immediate post-Civil War period when the Reconstruction Congress
sought to twist the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction for political
objectives. In order to understand properly that turn of events some
background is helpful, for the matter is somewhat technical and compli-
cated.
The Constitution provides that the "judicial Power" of the United
States shall extend to eight categories of cases: to those affecting ambas-
sadors and other public ministers; to those arising under the Constitu-
tion; to those in which the United States shall be a party; to those
between citizens of different states; and so on.' The Constitution also
provides for two categories of courts: "one supreme Court," and such
"inferior Courts" as Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish.107
The Constitution provides that the two most important categories
of cases (those "affecting Ambassadors" and those "in which a State
shall be a Party") are to be tried originally in the Supreme Court and
that "in all other Cases" (the other six categories) the Supreme Court
shall have "appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."'' 8
The question here, of course, is whether the power given Congress
t Id. at 700.
101H.R. 13915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 403 (1972).
t See text accompanying note 16 supra.
1'U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
'U.S. CONST. art. III, § I.
'U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
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to make "exceptions" and "regulations" includes the power to deny
entirely the right to appeal a case in which constitutional rights are
allegedly denied the litigant.
So much for the constitutional background of the post-Civil War
cases. The statutory background is equally complicated and technical.
It involves at least three separate but interrelated laws: one was enacted
in 1789, a second in 1867, and the third in 1868.
In 1789 Congress enacted a Judiciary Act and authorized the lower
federal courts to decide (by way of a writ of habeas corpus) the legality
of the imprisonment of those confined under the "authority of the
United States.""'0 If the lower court affirmed the legality of the impris-
onment and dismissed the writ of habeas corpus, the one held in custody
could appeal this decision to the Supreme Court. But the appellate
process was not spelled out or generally known; in fact it was described
as being "attended by some inconvenience and embarrassment."'"'
In 1867, Congress amended the 1789 Habeas Corpus Act in two
major respects:"' first, it authorized the lower federal courts to hear the
cases of those confined under both federal and state authority; secondly,
it expressly provided for an appeal to the Supreme Court and spelled
out the processes therefor. This brings us to the facts of the first case.
During Reconstruction, when the Southern states were under mili-
tary occupation, a Mississippi editor named McCardle was an "unre-
constructed rebel." He published in the Vicksburg Times an editorial
that severely criticized the Yankee general in command of that area.
The General arrested McCardle and held him for trial before a military
tribunal on charges of inciting to insurrection, disorder, and violence.
He did this under the authority granted him by the Reconstruction Acts.
McCardle filed a petition for habeas corpus with the federal court
under the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act, alleging that the Reconstruction
Acts were unconstitutional and therefore could not justify his incarcera-
tion. The federal circuit court dismissed his petition. McCardle ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, again under the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act.
The Government then moved to dismiss his appeal on the theory that
the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act was intended to help the former slaves,
not rebel editors like McCardle. The Supreme Court denied the motion
0 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81.
"'Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 324 (1868).
"'Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
[Vol. 50
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to dismiss the appeal" 2 and heard oral argument on the merits of the
case.
Congress then took an unprecedented step. Fearing that the Court
might hold the Reconstruction Acts unconstitutional, Conress passed a
law that expressly repealed the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act in so far as
the earlier law "authorize[d] an appeal" to the Supreme Court."3 The
United States for a second time moved to dismiss the appeal, this time
with success." 4
The Supreme Court held that because McCardle had filed his ap-
peal under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, the appellate provisions of
which had been expressly repealed by Congress, the Court had no option
but to dismiss the case. But, the Court also pointed out quite clearly that
it was error for McCardle to suppose that "the whole appellate power
of the court, in cases of habeas corpus, is denied", for the repealing act
of 1868 "does not except from that [appellate] jurisdiction any cases but
appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 1867," and it "does not
affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised" under the origi-
nal Judiciary Act of 1789."'
In short, the Supreme Court in McCardle was not faced with the
power of Congress to deny all appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to determine important constitutional issues. All the Court held
in McCardle was that Congress can cut off one of two or more alternate
appellate routes to the Supreme Court.
Any doubts on this score were resolved by Exparte Yerger,"6 which
was decided by the same Court in the same year. Yerger, like McCardle,
was a civilian who, also like McCardle, was arrested by the military
authorities in Mississippi and held for military trial. He filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus with the federal court in Mississippi, and
the writ was denied. He then filed an appeal to the Supreme Court under
the original Judiciary Act of 1789. The United States moved to dismiss
the appeal, relying as it had in McCardle on the 1868 "repealing"
statute. The Supreme Court refused to dismiss the appeal, holding that
the case was before it under the 1789 Act and that the "repealing section
of the act of 1868 is limited in terms, and must be limited in effect to
"'Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 327 (1868).
"'Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44.
"'Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
11id. at 515.
"'75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869).
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the appellate jurisdiction authorized by the act of 1867. ' ' m
United States v. Klein"8 arose as a result of the second and last
attempt by the Reconstruction Congress to utilize the courts for politi-
cal ends, and again Chief Justice Chase was quick to say no. The facts
were these. In 1862 Congress declared the forfeiture of all property
owned by those "aiding or abetting [the] rebellion.""' This 1862 "forfei-
ture" law also authorized the President to grant amnesty to those who
had engaged in the rebellion. 21 On December 8, 1863, President Lincoln
took advantage of this option and proclaimed to certain persons a par-
don and amnesty, thereby restoring all rights of property "except as to
slaves" to "every such person who shall take and subscribe a prescribed
oath of allegiance, and thenceforward keep and maintain said oath
inviolate."'' Under the Forefeture Act of 1862, the Government had
seized and confiscated some cotton belonging to a man named V.F.
Wilson, who had "aided the rebellion." After Lincoln's offer of "am-
nesty" in 1863, Wilson took the required oath of allegiance and "kept
the same inviolate"' 22 until his death. Then one Klein, who was
appointed to administer Wilson's estate, filed suit in the Court of
Claims to recover the value of the seized cotton (125,000 dollars). A
number of other similar suits were filed, including one by Edward Padel-
ford that became the test case.12 General Sherman had captured Sa-
vannah in December 1865 and had seized some cotton belonging to
Padelford. Thereafter Padelford took the required oath of allegiance
under Lincoln's 1863 amnesty proclamation and filed suit in the Court
of Claims for the return of his cotton. The Supreme Court affirmed his
right to recover. This did not sit well with Congress. The idea of rebels
swearing allegiance at this late stage of the war and thereby recovering
their property was too much for it to accept.
The Supreme Court handed down its Padelford decision on April
20, 1870, and by July 12 Congress had struck back. There were to be
no more decisions against the public treasury in favor of former rebels,
Presidential pardon or not. Congress provided that in all suits filed to
recover properV held by the Government under the 1862 "seizure" law,
"'Id. at 106.
"180 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
'Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, § 6, 12 Stat. 591.
"'id. § 13, at 592.
180 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 132.
1'Uid.
"'United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870).
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if the former owner relied upon a Presidential pardon as the basis for
recovery, the claim of Presidential amnesty "shall be taken and deemed
in such suit . . conclusive evidence that such person did take part in
and give aid and comfort to the late rebellion . . . and the jurisdiction
of the court in the case shall cease and, the court shall forthwith dismiss
the suit of such claimant."' 24
By the time Congress enacted this statute, Klein had won his suit
(on the basis of the Presidential pardon) in the Court of Claims, and
the Government had appealed to the Supreme Court. The Government
then moved the Supreme Court to dismiss the case and rule against
Klein because of the recently enacted Congressional statute.
The Supreme Court denied the motion. Chief Justice Chase ac-
knowledged a general right in Congress to "confer or withhold the right
of appeal"'2 to the Supreme Court from decisions of the Court of
Claims. "And," continued the Chief Justice, "if this act did nothing
more, it would be our duty to give it effect."'' 26 But the act did something
more than merely withhold appellate jurisdiction-it withheld appellate
jurisdiction "as a means to an end."' 7 The Chief Justice held that this
is not a legitimate "exercise of the acknowledged power of Congress to
make exceptions and prescribe regulations to the appellate power"'2 8 of
the Supreme Court.
The Chief Justice declared that "[i]t is the intention of the Consti-
tution that each of the great co-ordinate departments of the govern-
ment-the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial-shall be, in its
sphere, independent of the others."'' 9 He concluded that in this instance
"congress [had] inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legis-
lative from the judicial power,"'' 0 and he continued as follows:
Congress has already provided that the Supreme Court shall have
jurisdiction of the judgments of the Court of Claims on appeal. Can it
prescribe a rule in conformity with which the court must deny to itself
the jurisdiction thus conferred, because and only because its decision,
in accordance with settled law, must be adverse to the government and
favorable to the suitor? The question seems to use to answer itself.'3 '
1'2 Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 235.
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As a separate and additional reason for its refusal to dismiss the
case, the Court pointed out that the act of Congress also intruded upon
the constitutional power of the President to grant pardons. It said:
To the executive alone is intrusted the power of pardon ....
[ . . T]he legislature cannot change the effect of such a pardon
any more than the executive can change a law. Yet this is attempted
by the provision under consideration. The court is required to receive
special pardons as evidence of guilt and to treat them as null and
void. . . This certainly impairs the executive authority and directs
the courts to be instrumental to that end.
We think it unnecessary to enlarge. The simplest statement is the
best.13
2
Had the Chief Justice thought it necessary to enlarge, he might
have added that the judicial branch of the government is charged with
the power and obligation to ensure that the other branches of govern-
ment are kept within the limits set by the Constitution. This was decided
as early in our history as 1803 in the famous case of Marbury v.
Madison.133 There, Chief Justice John Marshall had to decide what to
do when an act of Congress went one way 34 and the Constitution went
a different way. 35 He had no problem. He wrote that "[i]t is a proposi-
tion too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legisla-
tive act repugnant to it .... ,13 Equally significant was his follow-
up: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is.' '1 31 He explained that were it otherwise, were
the courts impotent to act when the Congress overstepped the constitu-
tonal limits, the Constitution would give "to the legislature a practical
and real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict
their powers within narrow limits"; 3 ' were it otherwise, it would reduce
1321d. at 147-48.
1335 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). See text accompanying notes 88-91 supra for a discussion
of a different aspect of Marbury.
"'Congress provided by law that the Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction to issue
writs of mandamus to those holding office under the authority of the United States. Act of Sept.
24, 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 80.
" The Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction only in
two categories of cases, those affecting ambassadors and those in which states shall be a party.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2. It does not say that the Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction
to issue writs of mandamus to those holding office under the authority of the United States.
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"to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political
institutions-a written constitution ....
The obligation and power of the courts to fault an act of Congress
for reasons of unconstitutionality has not been challenged since the
Marbury decision of 1803. It goes without saying that this is not an easy
or pleasant task. The Framers of the Constitution recognized this and
gave back-up support to the judiciary with permanency in office (the
judges "shall hold their Offices during good Behavior"),' with financial
independence (their compensation "shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office")' 4' and though the express charge that the judges
exercise jurisdiction and hear all cases "arising under this Constitu-
ton." 142
But, the fact remains that the Supreme Court can hear these cases
alleging unconstitutional action by Congress only by way of appeal from
the lower courts; and the Constitution contains the proviso, as an adden-
dum to all the other powers granted the Supreme Court, that its appel-
late jurisdisdiction is subject to "such Exceptions, and under such Regu-
lations as the Congress shall make."'4
Is this small qualifying clause to be read as authorizing Congress
to deny to the courts the power to review those cases challenging the
constitutionality of congressional action and thereby overrule an almost
unbroken line of 170 years of history? Not unless one is willing to let
an exception engulf the rule; not unless one is willing to read the Consti-
tution as authorizing its own destruction; not unless one is willing to let
one small tip of the tail wag a very large dog.
What, then, is the intent and purpose of this qualifying phrase
regarding the appellate power of the Supreme Court? The history is
meager, but it points to a much more limited purpose.
Various proposed drafts of the Constitution were submitted to the
Founding Fathers in Philadelphia, and all of them provided for appel-
late review by the Supreme Court of constitutional cases "both as to
law and fact," without any qualification whatsoever. This touched off a
heated controversy, with some of the delegates protesting that this
clause, permitting review "as to fact," would give the Supreme Court
'3 id.
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the power to review and overturn the verdicts of juries. The various
proposals were then given to a "Committee of Detail," which reported
back the language as finally adopted: the Supreme Court should have
appellate jurisdiction "both as to Law and Fact," but "with such Excep-
tions and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."'"
Alexander Hamilton explained the purpose of the "exceptions and
regulations" clause in the debate over the Constitution:
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court . . . will extent to
causes determinable in different modes, some of the course of the
COMMON LAW [that is, by jury trial], others in the course of the
CIVIL LAW [without jury trial]. . . . [I]n the later, the reexamina-
tion of the fact [by an appellate court] is agreeable to usage [but not
in the former]. . . . To avoid all inconveniences, it will be safest to
declare generally, that the Supreme Court shall possess appellate juris-
diction, both as to law and fact, and that this jurisdiction shall be
subject to such exceptions and regulations as the national legislature
may prescribe ...
This view of the matter, at any rate, puts it out of all doubt that
the supposed abolition of the trial by jury, by the operation of this
provision, is fallacious and untrue. The legislature of the United States
would certainly have full power to provide, that in appeals to the
Supreme Court there should be no reexamination of facts where they
had been tried in the original causes by juries.'
Patrick Henry agreed with Hamilton that the power given the Su-
preme Court to determine appeals "both as to law and fact" would, if
unmodified, give the Supreme Court authority to review and overturn
jury verdicts; he also agreed that the clause authorizing Congress to
make "such exceptions" to the appellate jurisdiction was designed to
allay fears on this score. However, Henry doubted that the qualifying
clause authorizing Congress to make exceptions could, even if exercised
by Congress in the situation of jury trials. succeed in its purpose. He
argued to the Virginia Convention called to ratify the Constitution that
power once given to the Supreme Court by the Constitution to review
questions "of law and fact" could not then be taken away by Congress.
He commented on the floor: "I may be told that I am bold; but I think
myself. . . that Congress cannot, by an act of theirs, alter this jurisdic-
1"ld.
"'THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 513-14 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (emphasis in
original).
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tion as established. . . . It is subject to be regulated, but is it subject
to be abolished?"' He answered in the negative, because "[i]f Congress
can alter this part, they will repeal the Constitution"; 4 7 and further,
"When Congress, by virtue of this sweeping clause, will organize these
courts, they cannot depart from the Constitution; and their laws in
opposition to the Constitution would be void." 4' He concluded that "[i]f
Congress, under the specious pretence of pursuing this clause [the "ex-
ceptions and regulations" clause], altered it, and prohibited appeals as
to fact, the federal judges, if they spoke the sentiments of independent
men, would declare that prohibition nugatory and void."'4
The late Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts also commented on the
"exceptions and regulations" clause, and he agreed with Alexander
Hamilton and Patrick Henry that its thrust was to alleviate the fears
that the Supreme Court, under authority previously given, might review
and reverse the verdicts of juries. He asked a luncheon meeting of the
New York Bar why the Framers left it to Congress to regulate the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and then he answered his
own question in these words:
There came into play state pride . . . and another feeling that
since Anglo-Saxons prize the jury system, giving the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction as to matters of law and fact would give it the
opportunity to overturn jury verdicts, jury decisions, judgments based
on jury decisions in New York, in Pennsylvania and elsewhere. The
best compromise that could be made in the situation was to leave to
Congress the right to define the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. 0
In short, recourse to history indicates that the mischief which the
Framers intended to remedy with the "exceptions and regulations"
clause was the fear that without it the Supreme Court might review and
reverse the factual findings of juries.
Whatever validity this historical basis for the clause might have
today, the fact remains that the Congress, with few exceptions, has
honored the integrity of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. On




"mRoberts, Now Is the Time: Fortifying the Supreme Court's Independence, 35 A.B.A.J. 1, 3
(1949).
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the few occasions when the Congress has not done so, the Supreme
Court was quick to assert its judicial supremacy: in McCardle, in which
the Court permitted the Congressional blocking of one appellate route
while loudly pointing out an alternative road to its bench;' and in
Klein, in which the Supreme Court proudly asserted that the congres-
sional control over its appellate docket could not be used as a means to
the end of ensuring that the decisions of the Court would not be adverse
to the government and favorable to the suitor.152
If the Congress could not tell the Supreme Court how to rule on
cases in those post-Civil War years (against the "rebels"), there is no
reason to believe that the same Constitution now permits the Congress
to tell the Supreme Court how it should effectuate the fourteenth
amendment (against the black school children).
CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OVER THE "INFERIOR" FEDERAL COURT
The thrust of the proposed Nixon moratorium bills will fall most
heavily not on the Supreme Court, but on the district courts of the
United States, for in those courts the school integration cases are tried
and remedial orders are first issued. May the Congress, consistent with
our constitutional system of "checks and balances," deny them the
power to issue "busing" orders if the district court judges are convinced
that such orders are necessary for the vindication of constitutional
rights? The answer is, "Probably not."
The Constitution provides in article III that the "judicial Power of
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."'5 3 This power to "ordain and establish" inferior courts car-
ries with it the power to establish inferior courts with less than complete
jurisdiction. Thus, the very first Congress established "inferior" federal
courts and gave them jurisdiction to hear and decide cases between
citizens of different states but, added the Congress, not those suits be-
tween citizens of different states involving negotiable instruments trans-
ferred to the plaintiff by a citizen who resided in the state of the defen-
dant. '4 This "incomplete" grant of jurisdiction was sustained by the
Supreme Court in 1799.11
'See text accompanying note ! 15 supra.
"'See text accompanying note 127 supra.
".U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
'"Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78.
"'Turner v. Bank of North-America, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 8 (1799).
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Since that early date, Congress has granted the federal courts juris-
diction that is full or partial, complete or incomplete, as Congress has
deemed wise and expedient. 5 ' As a general proposition this is perfectly
proper, for there is no right to try a case in a federal court. Thus, in
Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 157 a construction company was incor-
porated in one state, Kline was a citizen of a different state, and the
company filed suit against Kline in the federal court basing jurisdiction
on "diversity of citizenship." Kline, the defendant in the federal suit,
promptly filed suit against the company in a state court, hoping that the
state forum would be more friendly to his cause. The company then
asked the federal court to enjoin the state court proceeding, and the
federal district court refused. On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that
the construction company did not have a "constitutional right" to have
its case tried in the federal court:
The Constitution simply gives to the inferior courts the capacity to
take jurisdiction in the enumerated cases, but it requires an act of
Congress to confer it. . . .And the jurisdiction having been conferred
may, at the will of Congress, be taken away in whole or in part; and
if withdrawn without a saving clause all pending cases though cogniza-
ble when commenced must fall. . . .A right which thus comes into
existence only by virtue of an act of Congress, and which may be
withdrawn by an act of Congress after its exercise has begun, cannot
well be described as a constitutional right. 158
There are many illustrations of the power of Congress to take away
the jurisdiction of the federal courts, in whole or in part. 1"9 The Norris-
LaGuardia Act is a familiar one. There, Congress declared that unless
certain enumerated conditions existed, "[n]o court of the United States
shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent injunction in
any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute . . ,. . The
's'C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 23-24 (2d ed. 1970).
157260 U.S. 226 (1922).
0'Id. at 234.
"'The Johnson Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of May 14,
1934, ch. 283, § 1, 48 Stat. 775), provides that the federal courts are not to enjoin or restrain the
utility rates made by a state agency so long as a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had
in the courts of such State." The Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970) (originally
enacted as Act of Aug. 21, 1937, ch. 726, § 1, 50 Stat. 738), similarly provides that no federal
court is to enjoin or restrain the collection of any tax under state law "where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."
" 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of March 23, 1932, ch. 90, § 7,47 Stat.
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Supreme Court said as dictum that "[t]here can be no question of the
power of Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior
courts of the United States."''
However, the Supreme Court is not so casual when the denial of
federal jurisdiction also constitutes a denial of substantive constitutional
rights. 6 2 And, a series of decisions by the various courts of appeal under
the Portal-to-Portal Act6 3 recognize that Congress may not exercise its
control over the "inferior" federal courts in a manner that denies those
courts the power to vindicate rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Some background to these decisions might be useful.
The Fair Labor Standards Act"4 requires the payment of minimum
wages, with time-and-a-half for hours worked in excess of an eight-hour
day or a forty-hour week. In a series of cases at the close of World War
II, the Supreme Court ruled that once an employee had crossed the
portal of his place of employment, the "work day" and the "work
week" included such preliminary and incidental activities as walking to
the place where the work was to be done, changing to work clothes in
the locker room, showering after work was over, and so on.' These
decisions were quite unexpected and resulted in "windfall" obligations
to thousands and thousands of employees. Almost two thousand suits
were filed for back pay, claiming liability in excess of five and one-half
billion dollars. The House Judiciary Committee investigated the situa-
"'Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938) (footnote omitted). Shinner, who
sought and obtained an injunction in the lower federal court, argued only that the picketing in front
of his store did not constitute a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
because none of the pickets were employed by him. He did not argue that he had a constitutional
right to a federal court injunction against labor union picketing.
" 2See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). There, a federal law forbade federal
courts to "stay proceedings in a state court." Nonetheless, the Supreme Court approved of a
federal court injunction against a threatened state criminal prosecution because the state criminal
law "chilled" the exercise of first amendment freedoms. See also Lipke v. Lederet, 259 U.S. 557
(1922), where a federal law forbade federal courts to entertain any suit "for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax." The Supreme Court, despite this jurisdictional
barrier, issued an injunction against the collection of money allegedly due under a federal tax law.
The Court's conclusion was that the amount of money demanded was an "unconstitutional pen-
alty" and thus not a "tax."
1-29 U.S.C. §§ 251-62 (1970).
1'429 U.S.C. §§ 206-07 (1970).
'0 Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946); Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v.
Local 6167, UMW, 325 U.S. 161 (1945); Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local
123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944).
"'The legislative background and the ensuing statute are discussed at some length in Scese v.
Bethlehem Steel Co., 168 F.2d 58, 59-61 (4th Cir. 1948).
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tion and concluded that payment of these claims would result in the
bankruptcy of thousands of employers. 6 '
Consequently, Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act, 6 7 which
did two things. First, it provided that no employer shall be subject to
any liability under the Fair Labor Standards Act because of a failure
to pay minimum wages or overtime compensation for work performed
in the past unless the work activities were compensable at the time they
were performed by either an express contract or by custom or prac-
tice. "' Secondly, the Portal-to-Portal Act provided that "[n]o court of
the United States . . .shall have jurisdiction of any action or proceed-
ing . . . to enforce liability . . . for or on account of the failure of the
employer to pay minimum wages or overtime compensation" unless the
work activities were compensable at the time performed by contract,
custom, or practice.' 9
Motions were immediately made to dismiss the cases then pending
in the federal courts. The plaintiffs argued against these motions for two
reasons: because the Portal-to-Portal Act deprived them of property
rights guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the Constitution, and be-
cause, a fortiori, the denial of access to a federal court to enforce these
claims was also unconstitutional. If Congress has absolute control over
the "inferior" federal courts and can choke off their jurisdiction even
when this results in the inability to enforce rights protected by the
Constitution, none of the courts would have considered the first issue
raised by the plaintiffs in the pending cases. But all of them did. They
all considered and rejected the contention that the Portal-to-Portal Act
denied property rights guaranteed by the Constitution.'
Typically, Judge Parker of the Fourth Circuit wrote that Congress
may not "take one man's property and give it to another or arbitrarily
strike down rights arising under contract."'' But, he added, "nothing
of that sort is involved" in the Portal-to-Portal Act, because the rights
stricken down by the statute are not rights arising out of contract but
rights created by statute, which can be destroyed by the same power that
"729 U.S.C. 251-62 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of May 14, 1957, ch. 52, 61 Stat.
84).
."'29 U.S.C. § 252(a) (1970).
"'Id. § 252(d).
"'E.g., Fisch v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1948); Battaglia v. General
Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948); Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 168 F.2d 58 (4th Cir.
1948); Rogers Cartage Co. v. Reynolds, 166 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1948).
"'Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 168 F.2d 58, 64 (4th Cir. 1948).
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created them.1 2 Judge Parker then concluded:
Since the provisions of sec. 2(a) of the act, striking down portal
to portal claims not based on contract, custom or practice are valid,
there can be no question as to the validity of sec. 2(d) denying jurisdic-
tion to the courts to entertain the claims. . . .Whether the denial of
jurisdiction would be valid if the provision striking down the claims
were invalid is a question which does not arise.
7 3
In a portal-to-portal suit in the Sixth Circuit (where the same issues
were raised), Judge Hicks concluded that the Act "in no way interferes
with the powers of the judiciary."'7 He then added that "[s]hould Con-
gress undertake to withdraw from the courts jurisdiction to consider and
determine pure questions of ownership or title to property . . a more
serious question would be presented, but we are not confronted here
with such a case.'1
75
Judge Chase was even more pointed in the portal-to-portal suit in
the Second Circuit. He wrote for that court as follows:
A few of the district court decisions sustaining section 2 of the
Portal-to-Portal Act have done so on the ground that since jurisdiction
of federal courts other than the Supreme Court is conferred by Con-
gress, it may at the will of Congress be taken away in whole or in
part. . . .We think, however, that the exercise by Congress of its
control over jurisdiction is subject to compliance with at least the
requirements of the Fifth Amendment. That is to say, while Congress
has the undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction
of the courts other than the Supreme Court, it must not so exercise
that power as to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law or to take private property without just compensa-
tion.76
President Nixon, of course, is asking Congress to do what it did
not do in the Portal-to-Portal Act-"to interfere with the power of the
judiciary to protect rights vested under the"'' 7 Constitution. His propos-
als challenge not only "busing" but also the very idea of law itself.
121d.
'id. at 65.
'Fisch v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 1948).
111d. at 273.
"'Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).
'Fisch v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 1948).
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The portal-to-portal cases strongly indicate that Congress has no
power to withhold or restrict the jurisdiction of the "inferior" courts
when the withholding or restriction of that jurisdiction would deny or
deprive persons of property rights guaranteed by the fifth amendment.
It follows that Congress has no power to withhold or restrict the juris-
diction of the "inferior" courts when the withholding or restriction (as
suggested by the Nixon "busing" proposals) would deny school children
of the rights already declared to be theirs under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
CONCLUSION
President Nixon wants to'put the Constitution on the back of the
bus and to give the federal courts a second-class citizenship among the
three independent branches of government. He has found a scapegoat
but no solution to a difficult problem.
Many parents have legitimate concerns that their children will be
transported from "nice" neighborhoods into schools that are old, dirty,
dilapidated, over-crowded, understaffed, and located in the "bad" sec-
tion of town. But if the schools are harmful for one child, they are
harmful for all children.
The problem is not the bus ride, but what one finds when the bus
ride ends. The solution is to replace the bad schools and to upgrade the
educational opportunities within them. This requires money, much more
than the token amount requested by the President.
But improvement of the schools is not enough. Education has had
to shoulder a disproportionate share of the burdens of overcoming the
effects of segregation. We should now put our efforts in overcoming
economic barriers, in overcoming segregated housing patterns, so that
every neighborhood will have its own desegregated school. But that,
unfortunately, lies in the future. As for the immediate present, we can
do no more than applaud the remarks made by Florida Governor Reu-
bin Askew when he asked the people of Florida to repudiate the anti-
busing proposal on the ballot in that state:
I hope we can say to those who would keep us angry, confused
and divided that we're more concerned about a problem of justice than
about a problem of transportation.
And that while we're determined to solve both, we're going to take
justice first. 78
17"Address by Governor Reubin Askew, Feb. 21, 1972, in South Today, May, 1972, at 3, col.
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